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HAPPY WARRIOR: LESSONS LEARNED FROM WATCHING FRED L. BANKS, JR.
James W. Craig*
When I think of Fred Banks, the first thing that comes to mind is his
laugh.1 It’s a visual and audible expression of his sense of humor and irony:
the eyes spark, the face crinkles, the grin spreads, and the sound is a mix of
laugh, chuckle, and giggle. Those in his presence have no doubt that the
man behind the laugh is enjoying the moment. During an otherwise
stressful situation, such as the middle of a trial or preparing for an appellate
argument, the Banks laugh is a reassuring reminder that his listeners are in
the presence of a leader who has taken the measure of the battle and will
not be intimidated. But one should not be misled to believe that Fred isn’t
taking the situation seriously; both before and after the moment that
occasioned the laugh, his tone is low, his words precisely measured, his
assessment realistic. For Fred Banks, at least in my experience, the two
have travelled together: an analytical mind reducing the situation to its
essence and posing the critical questions to formulate a response; and a
heart beating with the unrelenting engagement, even amusement, of the
moment.2 That is the kind of lawyer I have always aspired to be, so while
I cannot rightly claim Fred Banks as a “mentor,” he has had an outsized
influence on the way I have practiced law in the nearly forty years since we
first met.
The opportunity to learn from Fred Banks came early in my career
as a lawyer. In 1984, the Fall of my final year in law school, I applied for
associate positions at both Banks, Anderson & Nichols3 and Owens &
Byrd.4 During that academic year, Fred Banks first joined Owens & Byrd
to create Banks, Owens & Byrd, and very shortly after that (February 1985),
*
Jim Craig is the Director of the Louisiana Office of the Roderick & Solange
MacArthur Justice Center. He received his B.A. from Whitworth College in 1981 and his
J.D. from Mississippi College in 1985. He is licensed in Mississippi (1985) and Louisiana
(2011).
1
Reviewing the oral-history interview that Fred Banks gave to Beverly
Pettigrew Kraft in 2003, one is struck by the number of times “the laugh” is recorded.
Pettigrew Kraft, An Oral History with the Honorable Fred L. Banks, Jr., MISSISSIPPI ORAL
HISTORY PROGRAM, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI, https://usm.
access.preservica.com/uncategorized/IO_5a37a2c9-a759-4e03-8189-f8d601ce9009/ (last
accessed Apr. 7, 2022). The interview is interrupted by “(laughter)” ninety times—most
of them attributed to interviewee Banks.
2
And thus, Fred Banks is well described by Wordsworth’s poem which I have
borrowed as a title for this article.
3
The “Anderson” in this title was Coolidge Anderson; Reuben V. Anderson was
Circuit Judge of Hinds County during my third year of law school, and was appointed to
the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1985. “Nichols” was John Nichols.
4
The partners were Bob Owens and Isaac K. Byrd, Jr.
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was appointed to the Circuit Court bench by Governor Allain. After I
started work at (the re-re-named) Owens & Byrd law firm in the Summer
of 1985, I had the opportunity to work with Fred Banks on the cases he was
winding down to serve as a judge. During the years when Associate Justice
Banks served on the Mississippi Supreme Court, I briefed and argued cases
before him, many of which were appeals or post-conviction challenges to
death sentences. After his service as Circuit Judge and Supreme Court
Justice, Fred Banks joined Phelps Dunbar in 2001, and we practiced
together there as partners until I left in December 2010.
THE BOXES OF RAYMOND; OR, REAL CHANGE HAPPENS LOCALLY
Fred Banks graduated from law school at Howard University in
Washington, D.C., in 1968. Those were heady years for the civil-rights
movement, and Howard Law School—where Charles Huston and
Thurgood Marshall gave birth to the strategy for the school desegregation
campaign—was in many ways an epicenter of the litigation arm of that
movement. But Fred Banks apparently had no interest in staying in the
Northeast and developing what we would call today a “national reputation.”
Instead, he returned home to Jackson to work with the Jackson office of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”), led by Marian Wright Edelman.5
As such, Fred Banks, first with LDF and then with Anderson,
Banks, Nichols, & Leventhal—the first multiracial law firm in
Mississippi—represented the private plaintiffs in every school
desegregation case in the state. Thirty of the cases were consolidated in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. 6
Through 1968-69, the plaintiffs and the Federal Government (the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW”) and the Justice
Department) developed, litigated, and negotiated plans to systematically
create unitary school systems in all affected districts. Just before the
beginning of the 1969-70 school year, the Justice Department and HEW
moved to delay implementation of the plans for a full year. 7
Fred Banks and his colleagues pressed the cases on an expedited
track, resulting in the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Holmes
County Board of Education.8 Certiorari was granted October 9, 1969; the
case was argued on October 23, 1969, and decided six days later. The lower
courts were reversed, as the Court held:

5

Kraft, supra note 1, at 5.
Id. at 9.
7
Id. at 14-16.
8
396 U.S. 19 (1969).
6
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The Court of Appeals should have denied all motions for
additional time because continued operation of segregated
schools under a standard of allowing ‘all deliberate speed’
for desegregation is no longer constitutionally permissible.
Under explicit holdings of this Court the obligation of every
school district is to terminate dual school systems at once
and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools.9
On remand of the consolidated cases to the Fifth Circuit two weeks
later, the Court of Appeals held:
To effectuate the conversion of these school systems to
unitary school systems within the context of the order of the
Supreme Court in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of
Education, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the
permanent plans as distinguished from the interim plans
prepared by the Office of Education, Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, filed hereto and marked as
Appendices 1 through 30 shall be immediately enforced as
the plans of the respective systems.10
Immediate implementation was required: “No later than December
31, 1969 the pupil attendance patterns and faculty assignments in each
district shall comply with the respective plans.”11
In Hollywood, this is where the credits are rolled and pictures of the
victorious parents, students, and lawyers (then and now) are displayed. But
this was Mississippi, not Hollywood. And what Fred Banks, his law firm,
and his colleagues now had was an entire state’s worth of school districts
to change. And, equally as daunting, they had to monitor the districts to
enforce compliance with these orders.
That work was still ongoing when Fred Banks sent me, in 1985, to
our firm’s small office in Raymond, where scores of boxes held the paper
files for over seventy-five school-desegregation cases that were still subject
to monitoring and enforcement fifteen years later. It was an overwhelming
sight, not least for the realization of how much work was accomplished so
quickly, under opposition from local white officials, and maintained over
the years.
By “maintained,” I mean that Fred Banks and his colleagues, from
January 1970 until he assumed the Circuit Court bench in 1985, met with
9

Id. at 20.
United States v. Hinds Cnty. Sch. Bd., 423 F.2d 1264, 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1969).
11
Id. at 1268.
10
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parents, teachers, school administrators, and community groups in various
and sundry hamlets across Mississippi. They would challenge teacher
terminations or transfers, changes of bus routes, boundary lines for school
attendance, and other minutiae that never made it to the Hollywood screen.
When I saw those boxes, I began to understand: this man works for
real change through tedious, painstaking, fact-intensive efforts; teacher by
teacher, school by school, district by district. The sight of those boxes
comes back to me as the first lesson I learned from Fred Banks.
EXILED TO THE HOME-ECONOMICS KITCHEN—CHALLENGING ABUSE OF
POWER
My first trial in Federal Court was to be Fred Banks’s last trial in
his judicial career. It involved an assistant superintendent of schools in
Claiborne County, Mississippi, who had been “reassigned” by the recently
elected Superintendent to a newly-created position as “Director of
Reading”—a position with no duties, no assistants, and no office:
Mrs. Reeves' office was moved from the central
administrative building of the Claiborne County school
district to the kitchen of a home economics class in a junior
high school. Mrs. Reeves was given no supervisory
authority over other employees, and she did not receive a job
description for the new position until she took Noble's
deposition in this lawsuit. During the summer months after
Reeves was transferred, the Claiborne County school system
hired a number of reading aides for the second grade, though
appellant was not involved in the hiring process nor
informed of the hiring decision. The district court found that
certain “longtime perquisites were withdrawn from Reeves,
such as reimbursement for attendance at state-wide school
meetings and the overlooking of her shortened daily work
schedule.” After her reassignment, Reeves was required to
stay alone in her office until 5:00 p.m. although all other
administrative employees left around 4:00 p.m. 12
What had Ms. Reeves—who had given thirty years’ service to the
school district and its students—done to deserve such treatment? She had
responded to a subpoena issued in an earlier case brought by Fred Banks on
behalf of teaching assistants who had been fired by the same superintendent
12

Reeves v. Claiborne Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 828 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1987).
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for involvement in a campaign to recall school-board members, and had
testified to facts which disproved the superintendent’s pretext for those
firings.
This was a case about the abuse of power, but it did not involve
racial discrimination, because everyone involved—the plaintiff, the
superintendent, and the previously-fired teaching assistants—were AfricanAmericans. It was another lesson: where Mississippi counties, by the mid1980s, elect Black officials, the law should hold them just as accountable
for abuses of power as if they were white.13 That, as far as I could discern,
was Fred Banks’s philosophy. Not that this was a view of “race-neutrality,”
the false concept used to justify opposition to antiracist campaigns. Fred
Banks fought to empower Black Mississippians, in voting rights cases,
school desegregation cases, cases against law enforcement for excessive
use of force, and also in his legislative career and NAACP leadership. But
where some measure of power was secured to Black citizens, Fred Banks
would challenge the abuse of that power as surely as he would where the
abusers were white.
The case displays Fred Banks’s loyalty, also. Doubtless Ms. Reeves
knew what would happen if she testified on behalf of the teaching
assistants; and just as surely, Fred Banks let her know (either by words or
by implication, and surely with a laugh) that if any reprisal occurred, he
would be sure to fight for her.
THE TEEN ON THE BICYCLE—PERSUASIVE USE OF PROCESS
In his 2003 oral history interview, Fred Banks explained his
rigorous commitment to process as a judge:
I was a kind of a process person. I thought if we got this
right then the result was defensible. I didn't decide on the
result in the beginning and then try to make the process fit
the result. I didn't think that I was in any position to know
what happened. I could only go by the evidence that was in
the record and whether the process of presenting that
evidence to the fact finder was flawed. If the evidence is
sufficient and the process is as flawless as possible, then the
system ought to accept the result. But where the process is
flawed, you can't tell what would've happened had the
process not been flawed, so it needs to be done again
13

See IBRAM X KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 140 (2019) (discussing
“people of color using their limited power to oppress people of color for their own personal
gain”).
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regardless of how I feel about whether they reached the right
result because I don't know really what's right. 14
Thus, on the Mississippi Supreme Court, Justice Banks did not
refuse to consider affirming a judgment condemning a criminal defendant
to death. Regardless of his own beliefs, he was committed to applying the
law as it was or as it could appropriately be extended. As he told Beverly
Pettigrew Kraft, “I’m not that big on the death penalty under any
circumstances.”15 He explained:
I don't think it's a deterrent, number one. I don't think it
deters anybody from committing crime, and I don't know
whether it actually does much good for the victim's family,
although some say that it brings some kind of closure. I
don't think it's meted out equally, and the court has tried to
rein in the death penalty, so to speak, to narrow the
circumstances under which the death penalty should be
given.16
But in Justice Banks’s view, his commitment to the law forbade
using his personal opinions to override an otherwise proper verdict:
Kraft: Was that hard to do, just philosophically, from your
point of view, to affirm the death penalty?
Banks: Well there was some difficulty in it. I don't think that
I was committing a moral sin to affirm a death penalty where
it seemed that it met the criteria established by the State for
the death penalty. And what I found that I had to do was
fulfill my oath of office in fairly applying the laws of the
State of Mississippi, whether there was any doubt in my
mind about the process that led to the death penalty, and
knowing that it took only a single person on the jury, not the
entire jury, to stop the death penalty in any given case. I
ruled in favor of correcting the process in letting another jury
look at it. But where there was no error in the process and
where the crime seemed heinous enough, that it fell clearly

14

Kraft, supra note 1, at 50.
Id. at 52.
16
Id.
15
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within the narrow parameters of any defensible death
penalty process, I voted to affirm. 17
That meant, however, that where he did find issues with the process,
Justice Banks could apply an exacting, one might even say unforgiving,
view of the Eighth Amendment and Mississippi law to vacate the death
penalty. And perhaps because he was no “sure vote” against death, Fred
Banks was able to carry other members of the Court to the conclusion that
a capital case had to be re-tried. For example, in West v. State,18 the
defendant’s death sentence was reversed in an opinion written by Justice
Banks on grounds that the jury should have been instructed that any life
sentence they imposed would be served without parole, and on grounds that
the jury should not have been allowed to consider that the murder was
“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” where the facts did not fit a narrow
construction of that aggravating circumstance. Both of these errors were
the kind of “process-related” issues that could make a real difference at the
trial-court level; and both would also appeal to “process-minded” but
conservative justices who otherwise would support the imposition of capital
punishment.
It is clear from the oral history interview that the capital murder
conviction and death sentence given to Ron Chris Foster disturbed Fred
Banks. Foster, who was seventeen-years old at the time, had ridden a
bicycle to a convenience store and, in an attempt to take something from
the store, engaged in a tussle with the store clerk, during which the clerk
was killed by a discharge from his own gun. On direct appeal, the
Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Foster’s conviction and death
sentence.19 Justice Hawkins dissented, based on his view that Mississippi
statutory law gave the Court the power to determine that the death sentence
in a particular case was disproportionate, saying, “[b]ecause I am charged
by statute specifically to consider the punishment in addition to any
assignment of error, in view of Foster's age at the time of the commission
of the crime, and the environment in which he lived, the penalty of death
should not be imposed upon him, and I would so hold.”20
While joining this opinion, Justice Banks also dissented on two
other grounds. The first was that defense counsel was not permitted to ask
prospective jurors on voir dire whether they believed that a conviction of
capital murder required imposition of the death sentence in all cases,

17

Id. at 53.
725 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1998).
19
Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263 (Miss. 1994).
20
Id. at 1304 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
18
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regardless of any mitigating circumstances. 21 The second was that it was
error to automatically certify a defendant under eighteen as an adult to face
a capital-murder charge.22 Justice Banks’s views of the culpability of
persons under eighteen was ultimately joined by the United States Supreme
Court.23
Foster would ultimately be spared the death penalty, first, because
he presented a cognizable claim that he was intellectually disabled and
ineligible for capital punishment.24 Then, pending the hearing regarding
his disability, the United States Supreme Court decision in Roper
vindicated Justices Banks and Hawkins and resulted in a life sentence for
Foster.25 By then, Fred Banks had retired from the Court, and thus could
participate in public meetings advocating a life sentence for Foster, because
“the circumstances of this case just don't appear to be the kind that should
support the death penalty.”26 He based this on:
the freakish nature of the way the death occurred. One, it's
a seventeen-year-old, obviously not mentally acute and
certainly hasn't matured to a level where the death penalty
should be easily given. And then you put on top of that the
fact that this is a guy who rode a bicycle to (laughter) a
supposed robbery without a weapon, and somebody wound
up being killed which is unfortunate, but it simply doesn't
show the kind of—it is not of the heinous nature that cases
that deserve the death penalty should be. 27
So, consider the lesson of the teen on the bicycle. Rather than
staking out an emotionally satisfying position, voting to vacate all death
sentences as a Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, Fred Banks
devoted himself to a rigorous testing of the process employed in these cases.
21

Id. at 1304-11 (Banks, J., dissenting) (citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719
(1992)). This “reverse-Witherspoon” questioning (named from the decision which held
that prospective jurors who would never vote to impose death may be struck for cause) is
now standard in all capital cases.
22
Id.
23
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
24
Foster v. State, 848 So. 2d 172 (Miss. 2003).
25
Foster v. Epps, No. 1:08CV213-A-D, 2009 WL 2149618, at *2 (N.D. Miss.
July 14, 2009) (“Because Foster was seventeen at the time of the murder, the state filed a
motion with the Mississippi Supreme Court to vacate the death sentence, to withdraw the
order setting the [intellectual disability] hearing and to have the case remanded to the
Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi to have Foster sentenced to life without
possibility of parole.”).
26
Kraft, supra note 1, at 51.
27
Id. at 52.
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Perhaps others of us could not do so. But by taking his process-focused
position, Fred Banks was more likely to convince “center” or “center-right”
judges and justices to employ measures by which, at the end of the case,
prevent executions.
This falls within two similar aspects of Fred Banks’s approach. The
first, as discussed above with respect to school desegregation cases, takes
on the tedium of a rigorous, case-by-case approach to ensure change at the
level of “real life.” Thus, the process-oriented changes in a case like West
not only reversed his sentence, but they also are employed in future cases,
likely preventing other defendants from being sentenced to death in the first
place. The second, which inheres throughout this article, is a cautious
optimism about the law itself as a process for change.
THE SWIVEL CHAIR; OR, LACK OF CONCERN ABOUT STATUS
I have a very vivid memory about the first week after Fred Banks
joined us at Phelps Dunbar’s Jackson office. A few of us were pondering
strategy about a particular case in our new senior partner’s office. As a
question about a minor point of law was raised, Fred Banks grinned,
sparked his eyes, and said, “well, let’s see.” He spun his swivel chair
around to the credenza, where his computer was located. Accessing the
research databases quickly, he pulled a number of cases, read them off the
screen, and then swiveled back to us with his suggestions.
A quickly-gained lesson: whatever your status, put your ego aside
and do what you do best. It’s exactly why, Fred Banks explained to Beverly
Pettigrew Kraft, he declined to stay on the Mississippi Supreme Court, even
though he might have become the first Black Mississippi Supreme Court
Chief Justice:
Well, I didn't really have a great desire to be chief justice of
the supreme court. I mean it would've been an honor; it
would've been. I could've called myself the first black chief
justice in the state of Mississippi, and of course it would've
been an honor and a privilege to lead one of our branches of
government, but part of that work, the ceremonial part of
that work was not something that I had a great desire to
engage in.28

28

Id. at 126.
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This is exactly the Fred Banks I knew as a young lawyer, as an
advocate before the Mississippi Supreme Court, and as a partner in a
litigation firm. Ignore the status, do what you do best.
CONCLUSION
I cannot claim to be in Fred Banks’s inner circle of friends or
colleagues. But he has been an invaluable role model to me as a lawyer
seeking social justice in the post-civil rights era in the United States. I am
honored to have had the opportunity to learn from Fred Banks, and can only
hope to become a reflection of his ideal.

James W. Craig

